Why Ukraine’s Hope for NATO Membership Is
Understandable, But Will Remain Unfulfilled by Umland, Andreas
www.ssoar.info
Why Ukraine’s Hope for NATO Membership Is
Understandable, But Will Remain Unfulfilled
Umland, Andreas
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Umland, A. (2016). Why Ukraine’s Hope for NATO Membership Is Understandable, But Will Remain Unfulfilled.
IndraStra Global, 2(4), 1-3. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-48564-7
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION | Why Ukraine’s Hope for NATO Membership Is 
Understandable, But Will Remain Unfulfilled  
By Andreas Umland 
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv, Ukraine 
For obvious reasons, Moscow’s aggression against Kyiv has led to a marked growth in 
Ukrainians’ support for, and salience of, accession to NATO. During the last two years, 
Ukrainian public opinion has made a U-turn from skepticism against the Atlantic alliance to 
its enthusiastic embrace. Until 2013, almost two-thirds of Ukraine’s population was strictly 
against NATO membership. Today, around half of the Ukrainians explicitly want to join the 
alliance, with only a relatively small minority speaking out against. Kyiv is both actively 
introducing NATO standards in its army, and pressuring the West to finally open NATO’s 
doors to Ukraine. 
Yet, the Ukrainian government’s and civil society’s loudly pronounced NATO accession 
plans are built on a grave analytical confusion. It is true that no NATO member country 
would wish ill to the Ukrainians and that all the alliance’s governments would very much 
welcome increasing security in Eastern Europe. Yet, only some NATO member countries 
would be prepared to commit themselves to participating in military defense of the post-
Soviet republics that are currently outside NATO. Arguably, the quick accession of certain 
East European countries to NATO in 1999 and 2004 was based on a temporary West 
European misunderstanding of the nature and strength of Russian nationalism. Especially, the 
Baltic republics may have simply been lucky. 
Until recently, public opinion of many European countries stubbornly ignored or consciously 
downplayed both historic Russian imperialism and more recent political developments after 
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 the break-up of the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, they did so although, already in the 1990s, 
the writing on the wall seemed obvious. Among early indications of the continuing threat 
emanating from Moscow were the Kremlins’ ardent supports for Slobodan Milosevic’s 
imperial schemes in former Yugoslavia, or Russia’s consistent intransigence to withdraw its 
illegally stationed troops from Moldova. Other ominous signs included the shocking surges 
of such outspoken fascists as Vladimir Zhirinovskii, in Russian parliamentary politics in the 
mid-1990s, and Aleksandr Dugin, in post-Soviet intellectual life in the late 1990s. These and 
a number of similar phenomena already occurred during the first decade post-Soviet Russian 
history, and thus before Putin’s rise. Yet, they were not or insufficiently problematized within 
the EU’s relevant epistemic communities, i.e. foreign policy think-tanks, high-brow mass 
media, specialized governmental departments, relevant international organizations, and 
European political science associations. 
The dearth of published research and specialized journalism on post-Soviet Russian neo-
imperialism led to a lack of adequate alarmism among Europe’s opinion and decision makers. 
Until today, the entire international community of full-time researchers of post-Soviet 
Russian ultra-nationalism – arguably, one of the greatest threats to humanity today – consists 
of about a dozen long-term experts. Most of them live on temporary contracts and are busy 
with sustaining their daily lives, rather than able to fully focus on advancing and publishing 
their findings on the various permutations and sources of the post-Soviet extreme right as 
well as its impact on current Russian domestic and foreign affairs. 
After decades of practical experience with Tsarist and Soviet imperialism, the older nations 
of Eastern Europe – not least, the Balts – had a deeper understanding of the cycles and 
impulses of Russian politics, and were thus eager to act swiftly. During the mid-1990s, they 
spotted their small window of opportunity, and pressed hard for NATO membership, before 
the window closed again. Consciously or not, they took advantage of the misunderstanding of 
Russian affairs in Western mass media and political elites. As Russia was widely perceived 
as a modernizing, saturated and self-sufficient nation-state, it seemed of little relevance 
whether this or that East European country would be included into NATO, or not. 
Only recently, the Western public has come to perceive Russia as what it has always been 
since 1991: A post-imperial state whose chances of democratization and moderation, without 
massive Western help and resolute European integration, would be dim. Fortunately, for 
NATO’s new East European members, most people in the West remained unaware of 
the high security risks related to a possible resurgence of Russian imperial revanchism. They 
thus did not understand how far-reaching obligations their countries took upon themselves 
when the Washington Treaty’s reach was extended to Tallinn, Riga or Vilnius. It is not too 
bold a speculation to suspect that Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania would have today no chance to 
enter NATO – had they not already done so, in 2004. And if, in turn, Estonia were not a 
NATO member now, then – all other things being equal – its Eastern city of Narwa would 
probably today be occupied by Russia. 
It should not surprise that Ukraine, Georgia and other post-Soviet countries are deeply 
worried, about their current and future security. Against the background of their confrontation 
with one of the largest military powers on Earth, Ukrainians are naturally looking for NATO 
to provide them with help. Yet, these hopes are destined to remain unfulfilled, as the West 
today itself has become afraid of Russia. Today, not only Western unwillingness to invest 
into the security of such countries as Ukraine and Georgia constitutes a hindrance. After 
Russia’s manifest military interventions on Crimea, in the Donets Basin and in Syria, many 
people in Western Europe would be strictly against committing to a possible war with a 
 country that has the capacity to eradicate the whole of humanity. Oddly, Ukraine and Georgia 
will now only have a chance to enter NATO once their confrontations with Russia are fully 
over, i.e. when they would not need NATO’s protection anymore. 
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